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Abstract:  The article analyses the concept of  the mind in  Samuel Beckett’s The Unnamable to 
argue that the subject of the monologue may be interpreted either as a spirit describable in terms 
of  Cartesian substance dualism or as  a purely linguistic manifestation of  consciousness that is 
fragmented and not fully articulated. The narrator appears as a “diminished mind” or a “virtually 
disembodied” voice (Kennedy 1989:  139) that obsessively and desperately searches for the lost 
or fragmented core of  the self (Kennedy 1989:  140; cf.  McDonald 2007:  103). The voice might 
come from a soul suspended in a limbo or in a Geulingian hell where the devil makes its inhabitants 
uncertain of anything and encourages them to continue their searches for meaning and sense despite 
the pointlessness of the endeavour (Uhlmann 2006: 104–105). However, the voice may also result 
from an undisciplined process of writing that produces an uncertain and underdeveloped identity 
of the narrator. The two interpretations may be treated as compatible with each other. 
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Niewypowiedziane w Nienazywalnym  
Samuela Becketta 
Podmiot i umysł
Streszczenie: Artykuł analizuje pojęcie umysłu w Nienazywalnym Samuela Becketta w celu wykaza-
nia, że podmiot monologu może być rozumiany w dwojaki sposób: jako duch opisywalny z perspek-
tywy kartezjańskiego dualizmu substancjalnego lub jako czysto językowa manifestacja świadomości, 
która jest fragmentaryczna i nie w pełni wyartykułowana. Narrator ukazuje się jako niepełny umysł 
lub w zasadzie bezcielesny głos (Kennedy 1989: 139), który obsesyjnie i desperacko szuka utraco-
nego lub fragmentarycznego rdzenia jaźni (Kennedy 1989:  140; cf.  McDonald 2007:  103). Głos 
może należeć do duszy zawieszonej w otchłani lub piekle według koncepcji Geulincxa, w którym 
diabeł pozbawia jego mieszkańców pewności czegokolwiek i zachęca ich do dalszego szukania sen-
su i znaczenia pomimo beznadziejności tych wysiłków (Uhlmann 2006: 104–105). Głos może też 
jednak wynikać z nieuporządkowanego procesu pisania, który prowadzi do niepewnej i nie w pełni 
rozwiniętej tożsamości narratora. Obie interpretacje można traktować jako ze sobą kompatybilne. 
Słowa kluczowe: Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable, podmiot, umysł
1. Introduction
The Unnamable (published in French in 1953 and in English in 1958) constitutes the 
last part of Beckett’s Trilogy, preceded by Molloy and Malone Dies. It was written in the years 
1947–1949, when Beckett was diagnosed with a tumour in  his cheek. Although the tu-
mour was benign, at that time Beckett feared that it could be cancerous, which accelerated 
his work on writing. The fear of imminent death made him produce one of his best works 
in a very short time (Calder 1992 in: Acheson 1994: 103). The Unnamable has a form of “an 
incoherent monologue” (Friedman 2018:  191), in  which there are visible traces of  two 
sources of influence for Beckett. The first is Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy, which Beck-
ett studied for his Italian lessons with a private tutor Bianca Esposito during his time at 
Trinity College Dublin (Knowlson 2014: chapt. 3, sect. II). The second is René Descartes 
and in particular the philosophy of one of late Cartesians – Arnold Geulincx’s, which was 
extensively examined by Beckett during his École Normale days and later after his return 
to Dublin (Kennedy 1989: 140; Knowlson 2014: chapt. 9, sect. V; Uhlmann 2006: 70, 78, 
104). The article analyses how The Unnamable approaches the idea of the subject and the 
mind. The thesis of the article is that the subject in Samuel Beckett’s The Unnamable can be 
interpreted in a two-fold manner: as a spirit describable in terms of substance dualism or 
as a purely linguistic manifestation of consciousness that is fragmented and not fully articu-






















2. The self as possibly a disembodied spirit
It may be argued that The Unnamable presents a subject that significantly differs from fully 
developed human beings. Although the exact nature of the narrator in The Unnamable is 
uncertain, he has been described by some literary critics as a “diminished mind” or a “vir-
tually disembodied” voice (Kennedy 1989: 139; Friedman 2018: 191). The only source 
of information about the narrator are his words which form an incongruent monologue. 
Consequently, serious doubts arise as  to the character of his mind and the status of his 
identity. On the most basic level, the presentation of the narrator’s mind in The Unnam-
able could be compatible with purely phenomenological treatment of  the mind. In the 
phenomenological approach, there is concentration on experiences from the first-person 
point of view rather than any objective reality (Gallagher 2012: 7–8). The mind could be 
understood as a basis for various impressions, which does not have to have any contact 
with a physical body or any physical external world. Some passages of the last part of The 
Trilogy could be read in a way consistent with an assumption that there are only impres-
sions and there is no certainty about the existence or the nature of the body. The mind 
can make inferences on the basis of impressions received, from which it tries to figure out 
possible facts:
I know I am seated, my hands on my knees, because of the pressure against my rump, against the 
soles of my feet, against the palms of my hands, against my knees. Against my palms the pres-
sure is of my knees, against my knees of my palms, but what is it that presses against my rump, 
against the soles of my feet? I don’t know. My spine is not supported. (Beckett 1965: 304)
The passage may also evoke the idea of Cartesian scepticism. The mind conceives an 
idea that the subject is in a sitting position, but this knowledge is based merely on impres-
sions related to the feelings of pressure coming to the mind. The sole existence of the mind 
is sufficient for the existence of the impressions or projections, which do not need to come 
from a physical body. Even if the subject had some body, it would still not be sure if there 
were any external objects which would produce the feeling of pressure. In the Cartesian 
framework, such impressions could be generated by an evil spirit, so they could be falla-
cious. They might merely generate an illusion of being seated. Therefore, although the sub-
ject in The Unnamable seems to be endowed with a mind, its exact nature is unsure and its 
possible relations with any external reality are uncertain and rather conjectural. Nonethe-
less, in the section that follows I shall undertake the task of reconstructing a possible onto-
logical scenario described in The Unnamable.
2.1. The soul in afterlife
The possible Cartesian treatment of the narrator’s impressions supports a related reading 
of the monologue, in which the source of the narration would be the voice of a soul sus-
pended in a limbo resembling Dante’s Inferno (Kennedy 1989: 139–140). The identifica-






















of the terms “mind” and “soul” in Cartesian philosophy (cf. Descartes 2006a: 29, 39, 48; 
Descartes 2006b: 95; Descartes 1989: 90). 
The narrator of  The Unnamable may be “a voice from beyond the grave” (Brater 
2003: 51), although its exact nature is not determined: it is not clear whether it comes from 
a human soul or a different spiritual being. The possibility of  treating the subject in  The 
Unnamable as a fallen angel or demigod (Kennedy 1989: 142) could be supported by the 
narrator’s declaration: “I am Matthew and I am the angel, I who came before the cross, be-
fore the sinning, came into the world, came here” (Beckett 1965: 301). Yet, the sentence is 
inherently ambiguous: Matthew is juxtaposed with an angel, who might supposedly have 
come before Christ or even before the creation of the human world. 
Characters who are present in this new realm are described by the narrator in a way 
that suggests that their material forms either have disappeared or have been at least changed 
or distorted. This is in  line with the narrator’s doubts if creatures present in  this new 
place could cast shadows:  “Malone is there. Of his mortal liveliness little trace remains. 
[…] It was while watching him pass that I wondered if we cast a shadow. Impossible to say” 
(ibid.: 292). It seems that beings present in this new realm, e.g. Malone or the narrator, who 
were described in previous parts of The Trilogy as living entities, have now entered a new 
phase of existence without their previous mortal bodies. Likewise, the narrator describes 
himself as a person with no clearly defined material form. His body seems to be in a state 
of  decay, fragmented or dislocated, which brings to mind the surreal image of  a decom-
posed corpse: 
My state of decay lends colour to this view, perhaps I had left my leg behind in the Pacific, yes, 
no perhaps about it, I had, somewhere off the coast of  Java and its jungles red with rafflesia 
stinking of carrion, no, that’s the Indian Ocean, what a gazeteer I am, no matter, somewhere 
round there. (Beckett 1965: 317) 
Although the narrator seems to be unsure of what really happened to his body, it does 
not seem to be of any significant concern to him. It might lead to the interpretation that the 
narrator is now only a ghost who became separated from his material form, which could ex-
plain his indifference to the state or location of his body. Although the narrator does not un-
equivocally reject the idea that he could still be connected with his body, this option seems 
implausible. The narrator associates the bodiless state with his emotional or sensational 
insensitivity: “Ah if I were flesh and blood, as they are kind enough to posit, I wouldn’t say 
no, there might be something in their little idea. They say I suffer like true thinking flesh, 
but I’m sorry, I feel nothing” (ibid.: 353). This fragment could be interpreted as referring to 
the Cartesian concept of “a thinking thing” understood as the mind (Descartes 2006b: 15). 
The narrator seems to deny that he could be “a thinking flesh”, which might be understood 
as a rejection of the material substance. The dual composition of a human, which consists 
of bodily and spiritual substance, is believed in the framework of Cartesian substance du-
alism to allow for the separation of the two and an independent existence of the soul. Al-
though Descartes was not able to prove that the soul could be immortal and he believed 
that it was up to God to decide whether the soul could exist after the death of the body 
(Descartes 2006b: 90–91), it  seems that the narrator has become disentangled from his 






















The narrator has reached a state in which nothing about him changes: “Nothing has 
ever changed since I have been here. But I dare not infer from this that nothing ever will 
change” (Beckett 1965: 293). The state of changelessness may stem from the fact that his 
body no longer performs its physiological functions since it is already dead, which might 
be especially true of his organ responsible for cognitive processes: “Perhaps it is liquefied 
brain” (ibid.:  293). The invariability in  the mental sphere is contrasted with significant 
changes that took place in the narrator’s dead body after his death. His feelings of immu-
tability are in fact interconnected with and possibly determined by physical changes in his 
dead body. The state of his bodily decay makes it impossible for the narrator to have nor-
mal human feelings: “There is nothing saddening here” (Beckett 1965: 293). On the other 
hand, the narrator might still have at least an illusion of a material form, since he describes 
himself as sitting: “No, I have always been sitting here, at this selfsame spot, my hands on 
my knees, gazing before me like a great horn-owl in an aviary” (ibid.: 293). Nonetheless, 
the reference to a sitting position may be explained by traditional images of ghosts whose 
outlines still resemble those of their material bodies. 
The narrator may also be interpreted as presenting his final form or “full actualization”, 
which he has reached after death. Since all facts about his existence have been already deter-
mined and his human life has come to an end, the narrator may safely say: “Then at last I can 
set about saying what I was, and where, during all this long lost time” (ibid.: 331). It seems 
that this state of a final actualization has been achieved recently since the narrator is still not 
accustomed to it: “For this feeling of being entirely enclosed, and yet nothing touching me, 
is new” (ibid.: 345). The narrator seems to be a spirit that survived the death of his body 
and can no longer disappear since it  is immortal: “Is not this rather the place where one 
finishes vanishing?” (ibid.: 293). The narrator also alludes to the Christian idea of creating 
humans out of dust into which they turn again after their death: “I’m like dust, they want to 
make a man out of dust” (Beckett 1965: 348). The narrator has probably died as a human 
and all efforts to bring him back to the state before his death are futile. Thus, it is justifiable 
to assume that the narrator is of a purely spiritual nature, confined to a realm designated for 
ghosts, souls or other angels, where he has entered some kind of afterlife.
2.2. Geulingian hell
The spiritual realm the narrator is located in  may have a specific origin in  Western phi-
losophy. This interpretation is in  line with research by Anthony Uhlmann who presents 
the narrator as a soul suspended in Geulingian hell (Uhlmann 2006: 104). Arnold Geu-
lincx (1624–1669) was a Flemish philosopher inspired by Cartesian philosophy, whose 
descriptions of hell in the works Metaphysica Vera, Metaphysics and Ethics remain pertinent 
to the analysis of Beckett’s works (ibid.: 69–72). Although discussed in the context of René 
Descartes’ and Baruch Spinoza’s philosophies, Geulincx remains a rather obscure figure 
in philosophical circles, but has become well-known in Beckettian studies (ibid.: 69). Beck-
ett examined in detail Geulincx’s texts in the Library of Trinity College Dublin, which re-
sulted in his Notes to Arnold Geulincx, Ethica, Metaphysica Vera and Questiones Quodlibeticae 
now stored at Trinity College Dublin (Uhlmann 2006: 70). Beckett also explicitly refers 






















Geulincx, dead young, who left me free, on the black boat of Ulysses, to crawl towards the 
East, along the deck” (Beckett 1965: 51). 
The possibility that the narrator’s location is in fact a kind of hell is supported by his 
references to Satan. The narrator believes in  the existence of  the devil and is inclined to 
think that the place he occupies was created by this evil creature:
For I am obliged to assign a beginning to my residence here, if only for the sake of clarity. Hell 
itself, although eternal, dates from the revolt of Lucifer. It is therefore permissible, in the light 
of  this distant analogy, to think of myself as being here forever, but not as having been here 
forever (ibid.: 295–296). 
The devil starts to occupy the narrator’s thoughts and is treated as another possible 
inhabitant of the place the narrator is located in: “Worm, Worm, it’s between the three of us 
now, and the devil take the hindmost” (ibid.: 339). 
The narrator is sometimes unsure about the true nature of the place he is suspended in. 
He assumes that it could be hell or paradise or the Earth, in “a typically Beckettian move-
ment of self-contradiction” (Astro 1990: 82). In general, the entire monologue in The Un-
namable is characterised by hesitations, doubts and the lack of certainty. This is captured 
by a humorous remark made by the narrator about the constant human struggle to make 
inferences: “So they build up hypotheses that collapse on top of one another, it’s human, 
a lobster couldn’t do it” (Beckett 1965: 372). The narrator’s state of uncertainty resembles 
Cartesian suppositions that our experiences could be merely a dream. The following frag-
ment illustrates the narrator’s confusion which permeates all his knowledge and in particu-
lar affects his opinion about the place he occupies:
[…] unusual hell when you come to think of  it, perhaps it’s paradise, perhaps it’s the earth, 
perhaps it’s the shores of a lake beneath the earth, you scarcely breathe, but you breathe, it’s not 
certain, you see nothing, hear nothing, you hear the long kiss of dead water and mud, aloft at 
less than a score of fathoms men come and go, you dream of them, in your long dream there’s 
a place for the waking, you wonder how you know all you know […] (ibid.: 392). 
This lack of certitude, which leads to constant doubting, is a typical feature of the hell 
described by Geulincx in Metaphysica Vera. The Geulingian hell is “a place where the guid-
ance of God is removed from us and we become completely unknowing, completely at the 
mercy of our ignorance” (Uhlmann 2006: 103). The narrator in The Unnamable feels an 
existential void when he is left to his own devices without any divine supervision. If God ex-
ists, he does not care about human existence or fate and is indifferent to human chagrin. The 
narrator feels abandoned by God: “what have I done to God, what have they done to God, 
what has God done to us, nothing, and we’ve done nothing to him, you can’t do anything 
to him, he can’t do anything to us” (Beckett 1965: 386). The lack of divine control deprives 
the narrator of any sense of direction or points of reference. 
A recurrent motif in The Unnamable is also a constant effort or compulsion to continue 
what has been begun. This attitude motivates the narrator to unceasingly investigate various 
strains of thought. Since there is no consensus on the matters investigated, it leads to the 
internal split of “the persona of the speaker”, who often conducts “an internal argument with 






















which also captures the idea of a language constructing the identity of the narrator (dis-
cussed in section 3): 
[…] you must go on, I can’t go on, you must go on, I’ll go on, you must say words, as  long 
as there are any, until they find me, until they say me, strange pain, strange sin, you must go on, 
perhaps it’s done already, perhaps they have said me already, perhaps they have carried me to 
the threshold of my story, before the door that opens on my story, that would surprise me, if 
it opens, it will be I, it will be the silence, where I am, I don’t know, I’ll never know, in the silence 
you don’t know, you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on (Beckett 1965: 414). 
The incurable endeavour to continue the musings once they have been started may be 
associated with the features of hell described by Geulincx. Beckett’s Notes to Arnold Geu-
lincx, Ethica, Metaphysica Vera and Questiones Quodlibeticae1 from 1936 shed light on pos-
sible sources of this image of hell. Geulincx in Opera philosophica describes people in hell 
as those who stubbornly follow a course of action once chosen:
They are, accordingly, led by stupidity, and a certain stubbornness in acting, and by the diaboli-
cal instigation to persist with something once it has been started (for this is at the instigation 
of the Devil […]2 (in: Uhlmann 2006: 105) 
The only reason for those people to continue certain actions is the fact that they have 
begun them. This mindset is influenced by the devil, who makes people abandon their rea-
sonable assessment of the situation:
we learn from the Inspection of Ourselves that we also are subject to sin, in fact subject to the 
Devil; for he is the instigator who continually inculcates into us this creed: Continue, because 
you have begun… since something should not be continued because you have begun it but 
because Reason dictates it.3 (in: Uhlmann 2006: 105) 
The narrator’s ceaseless questioning and searching may stem from his immersion 
in a Geulingian hell where all subjects are led on by the devil and left in a state of utter 
uncertainty. 
3. Linguistic manifestations  
of the disintegrated and disunified self
The monologue in  The Unnamable has been described by some scholars as  an obsessive 
and “desperate search for the lost” or fragmented “core of the self ” (Kennedy 1989: 140; 
1 Beckett, Samuel 1936. Notes to Arnold Geulincx, Ethica, Metaphysica Vera and Questiones Quodlibeticae, TCD 
MS 10971/6, Manuscripts Department, Trinity College Library Dublin, Republic of  Ireland; typescript, page 24 
(in: Uhlmann 2006: 105). 























cf. McDonald 2007: 103). It may be stated that the narrator in The Unnamable lacks an inte-
grated self (McDonald 2007: 108) since it does not manifest “a unity in thought, emotion, 
and action”, which in cognitive science is a prerequisite for the integration of the self (Kuhl 
et al. 2015). The experience of the narrator is also not unified (McDonald 2007: 108) since 
the unification would require that particular experiences should be subsumed in more com-
plex experiences (Bayne 2010: 26–28). In the monologue, there is merely a linear sequence 
of constantly shifting ideas which are not connected by a common perspective or interrelat-
ed themes. This diagnosis corresponds with Charles Lyons’s description of the monologue 
as “a succession of the discoveries and losses of the self ”, which produces “the shifting vision 
of a single consciousness” (Lyons 1983: 24), and with Daniel Katz’s reference to “the oscil-
lations in The Unnamable between the impossible identifications and the impossible dis-
avowals of the various narrative instances” (Katz 2009: 150). The uncertainty concerning 
the identity of the narrator may in fact be one of the indications of the incertitude permeat-
ing Geulingian hell. The coexistence of these two possible interpretations conforms with 
Carla Locatelli’s idea that The Unnamable’s writing undertaken in  chaotic circumstances 
may indicate “that there is no absolute knowing and no absolute not-knowing” (Locatelli 
2010, sect. “The extremity...”). The aporic character of the situation described in the novel 
is responsible for “the sheer indecidability of interpretation and reading” (ibid.: sect. “The 
extremity...”).
The absence of an integrated self and unified experience has distinct linguistic mani-
festations in  the monologue. First of all, the voice may be treated as  the result of undis-
ciplined process of writing. The impression of disorderly writing is produced by the use 
of simple vocabulary, frequent repetitions, pervasive contradictions and uncertainties, dif-
ficulties in expressing oneself, and progressing disappearance of punctuation, which results 
in a monologue that is constituted by incoherent utterances. Secondly, on a deeper level 
the unsystematic writing may depict the narrator’s uncertain and underdeveloped identity. 
The features of undisciplined writing contribute to the effect of the linguistic manifestation 
of fragmented consciousness.
In The Unnamable, there is a noticeable concentration on the language itself rather 
than its possible external references. This focus may give an impression of “mere automa-
tism”, in which “language […] often seems to speak itself ” (Maude 2014: 49). The narrator 
has a liking for juggling with words to find unusual linguistic connections or associations. 
This inclination is underlined by the narrator in his expression: “he knows how to stimu-
late the flagging spirit, stop the rot, with the simple use of this mighty word alone […]” 
(Beckett 1965: 376). Consequently, the identity of the narrator consists in being both the 
source and the receiver of linguistic expressions. There is no external audience that could 
assess or interpret the narrator’s expressions. The use of language itself constitutes the sub-
jectivity of the narrator, which is expressed in his words: 
Assume notably henceforward that the thing said and the thing heard have a common source 
[…]. Situate this source in me, without specifying where exactly, no finicking, anything is pref-























At the same time, due to a dexterous use of langue, the subject also describes himself 
as though he possessed the mind, identifiable as his soul, and the body. This dual constitu-
tion may be merely the result of a linguistic attribution of dualistic qualities to the subject, 
which may not correspond to any actual nature of the subject in reality: 
Equate me, without pity or scruple, with him who exists, somehow, no matter how, no finick-
ing, with him whose story this story had the brief ambition to be. Better, ascribe to me a body. 
Better still, arrogate to me a mind. Speak of a world of my own, sometimes referred to as the 
inner, without choking. Doubt no more. Seek no more. Take advantage of the brand-new soul 
and substantiality to abandon, with the only possible abandon, deep down within. And finally, 
these and other decisions having been taken, carry on cheerfully as before. (ibid.: 390) 
The story told by the narrator is likely to be simply the product of  language, which 
may not describe any actual situation or even any theoretically possible, non-contradictory 
situation. In fact, not only the identity of  the narrator but also the reality itself are con-
structed through the use of language. The language does not function as a tool to describe 
an external reality, but truly constitutes the reality. In Beckett’s monologue, to exist is to be 
formulated within language: 
It is I invented him, him and so many others, and the places where they passed, the places where 
they stayed, in order to speak, since I had to speak, without speaking of me, I couldn’t speak 
of me, I was never told I had to speak of me, I invented my memories, not knowing what I was 
doing, not one is of me. (Beckett 1965: 395–396) 
This approach to the constitution of the subject separates Beckett from modernist fic-
tion and its preoccupation with epistemological issues related to the investigation or in-
spection of  the objective world. As has been pointed by Brian McHale, Beckett’s Trilogy 
exemplifies the transition from modernist to postmodernist fiction (2004:  12–13). The 
postmodernist aspect of Beckett’s prose stems from the abandonment of the mimetic func-
tion of  literature (McDonald 2007:  88) or any “remnants of  the realistic mode” (Brater 
2003: 51). Instead of probing a stable external world, Beckett’s postmodernist prose “dis-
trusts the idea that the name comes after the thing at all, claiming instead that language 
constructs its object” (McDonald 2007: 121). The Unnamable may be interpreted as mani-
festing a characteristic feature of Beckett’s postmodernist fiction, in which “There is no self 
anterior to the speaking self; language makes the self, it does not simply reflect it” (ibid.). 
The narrator resorts to the identification with language, since in him language manifests 
itself, without reference to any objectively existing entities. This approach may be further 
developed in the direction of Leslie Hill’s interpretation of the monologue as the language 
speaking itself rather than as a manifestation of  the existence of some fictional character 
(Hill 1997: 922). It may also lend support to Marcin Tereszewski’s description of The Un-
namable as a text in which “language assumes center stage in a spectacle of self-erasure and 
aporetic logic” (Tereszewski 2008: 68). This identification with language may be associ-
ated with the metaphor that compares the narrator to the tympanum, which is a human 
bodily part where sounds are registered to be later processed and understood as linguistic 
constituents. The activity of the tympanum resembles the constant activity of the narrator, 






















[…] perhaps that’s what I feel, an outside and an inside and me in  the middle, perhaps 
that’s what I am, the thing that divides the world in  two, on the one side the outside, on 
the other the inside, that can be as thin as foil, I’m neither one side nor the other, I’m in the 
middle, I’m the partition, I’ve two surfaces and no thickness, perhaps that’s what I feel, myself 
vibrating, I’m the tympanum, on the one hand the mind, on the other the world, I don’t belong 
to either […]. (Beckett 1965: 383) 
In the tympanum metaphor, the narrator distances himself both from the external 
world and any subjective world of  the mind. Instead, he presents himself as a solely lin-
guistic construct. As a result, the incongruent linguistic expressions create a representation 
of consciousness that is fragmented and not fully developed. The consciousness produced 
in this way may not be possessed by any living organism, but could be an entirely theoreti-
cal construct, merely a sketch of what could exist. The disunity or disintegration may also 
be understood as an effect of the subject’s ignorance, uncertainties and constant search for 
something that cannot be attained. This interpretation complies with the vision of a Geulin-
gian hell where the devil makes its inhabitants uncertain of anything and encourages them 
to continue their searches for meaning and sense although they are utterly futile. 
4. Conclusions
To recapitulate, it may be stated that The Unnamable is open to two compatible interpreta-
tions. Firstly, the subject presented in the monologue could be understood as a spirit sus-
pended in a limbo or hell, which resembles the hell described by a Cartesian philosopher, 
Arnold Geulincx. Secondly, the subject could be understood as a merely linguistic concep-
tualization of a disunified or disintegrated consciousness. However, if the reader attempts 
to reconstruct a possible scenario behind this incongruous monologue, the linguistic in-
consistencies and gaps may be interpreted as  an indication of  the narrator’s uncertainty 
about possible states of affairs. The lingering narration may be understood as the effect of an 
eternal fight to continue something that has been begun, despite the pointlessness of the 
endeavour, which resembles the atmosphere of a Geulingian-like hell. 
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